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THE NEW CERTIORARI AND A NATIONAL STUDY
OF THE APPEALS COURTS
Carl Tobiast
Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari:Requiem for the Learned
Hand Tradition1 is a thought-provoking critique of the United States
Courts of Appeals. Professors William Richman and William Reynolds
maintain that dramatic increases in appellate filings have transformed
the appeals courts during the last quarter-century, prompting systemic
constriction of procedural opportunities, particularly for parties with
few resources or little power. The authors find these changes profoundly troubling and propose that Congress radically expand the
number of appellate judges.
Individuals and institutions, such as expert study committees,
which have analyzed the federal courts, agree with much of the authors' descriptive assessment. 2 Less consensus, and even some controversy, attend the writers' provocative suggestion that the creation of
many additional judgeships will resolve the conundrum posed by
growing dockets and numerous other difficulties which the appellate
courts confront today. These factors mean that the authors' valuable
contribution to understanding the appeals courts warrants a response.
This essay undertakes that effort.
My paper invokes a number of federal court studies and applies
insights gleaned from the continuing debate which involves possible
division of the Ninth Circuit.3 This court is instructive because its ext Professor of Law, University of Montana. I am a member of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for the United States District Court for the District of Montana
and of the District Local Rules Review Committee of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council;
however, the views expressed here are my own. I wish to thank David Aronofsky, Thomas
E. Baker, Chris Flann, Arthur Hellman, Tom Huff, Jeffrey Renz, Lauren Robel, Peggy Sanner, and Rod Smith for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for
processing this piece, as well as the Harris Trust and Ann and Tom Boone for generous,
continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
I William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. Rrv. 273 (1996).
2 See infra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
3 See S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. REP. No. 197, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (presenting the Senate judiciary committee's conclusions regarding a potential
Ninth Circuit division); see also Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting,44 EMORY LJ. 1357 (1995) (analyzing legislative attempts to divide the Ninth Circuit). See generally Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposalto Divide the United
States Court ofAppealsfor the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a GoodIdea, 22 ARiz. ST. LJ. 917 (1990)
(arguing against a Senate proposal to divide the Ninth Circuit).
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perience with mounting caseloads epitomizes developments in many
regional circuits since the 1970s and typifies the treatment that the
writers criticize.
I first evaluate the authors' descriptive account and identify aspects of their discussion with which a number of federal court observers concur and differ, and I find considerable agreement about most
of the features. For example, numerous analyses of the federal civil
and criminal justice systems and the ongoing controversy over the
Ninth Circuit reveal that the appellate courts have undergone a transformation in the past several decades.
My response then assesses the writers' prescription. I ascertain
that phenomena ascribed to multiplying appeals and many additional
complications facing the appeals courts constitute a polycentric problem. This difficulty apparently requires application of a varied mix
comprising myriad available solutions, but the precise combination of
approaches which would be most efficacious remains unclear. The
judiciary's expansion is only one potential remedy. However, it would
also impose disadvantages, might be less effective than numerous alternative solutions, and might be politically unrealistic. The above difficulties show, therefore, that Congress should appoint a national
commission to evaluate the appellate system. I conclude with recommendations for creating this entity and for how it might proceed.
I
THE DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT

A. A Brief Description
Richman and Reynolds find that increasing numbers of appeals
have dramatically transformed the appeals courts from the institutions
which they were as recently as a generation ago.4 The authors assert
that growing dockets have led the courts to implement numerous
mechanisms that depart from the appellate ideal or the "Learned
Hand tradition," whereby judges heard oral arguments in virtually all
cases, closely conferred, and wrote thoroughly-reasoned opinions
5
which explained the results and were publicly available.
4 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 274-75, 278-79; see also infra notes 16-19
and accompanying text (affording examples of individuals and entities that concur). See
generalyLevin H. Campbell, Into the Third Century: Views oftheAppellateSystemfrom the Federal
Courts Study Committee, 74 MASS. L. REv. 292 (1989) (detailing the effects of exploding

caseloads on the appellate courts).
5 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 278-97; see alsoTHOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONINC JusTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 21-27, 106-50
(1994) (defining appellate ideal and surveying mechanisms that depart therefrom); infra
note 18 and accompanying text (affording examples of mechanisms).
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The writers claim that certain appeals continue to receive the
complete panoply of procedures.6 These include major securities
cases, which the authors contend that appellate judges perceive as important, typically measured in terms of large monetary stakes. Disposition of these appeals strikingly contrasts with the severely truncated
treatment accorded to other actions, such as prisoner and social security appeals, which judges consider less significant.7 Many of those
cases receive no oral argument or published opinion, while court staff,
rather than judges, effectively resolve the appeals. 8 The writers thus
find glaring discrepancies between wealthy, strong parties and litigants with limited economic or political power who have narrowly circumscribed access to appellate courts.
Richman and Reynolds assign considerable responsibility for
these developments to the federal judiciary. 9 The authors suggest that
the bench, largely for reasons of professional satisfaction, including
prestige and collegiality, has opposed the creation of additional judgeships to treat the conditions. The writers assert that countervailing
concepts and empirical data refute the judiciary's arguments against
expansion. For instance, numerous judges have stated that enlarging
their numbers would erode the appellate bench's quality and undermine the collegiality which improves decisionmaking. 10 In response
to these arguments, the authors observe that there are many highly
qualified candidates who could fill the newjudgeships.'1 The writers
6

See Richman & Reynolds supra note 1, at 19-21. See generallyCHRISTOPHER E.

JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST-

FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT ADMINISTRATION 1-13,

SMITH,

15-43, 95-124

(1995) (describing court administrative practices and priorities, particularly for treating
increasing appeals).
7 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 295-97; see also Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and
Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L REV. 485, 495-98 (1988-89) (analyzing judicial treatment
of litigants with limited economic or political power).
8 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 280-81, 286, 290; see also infra notes 18, 30
and accompanying text (providing examples of truncated treatment and staff delegation).
See generally Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and
Government Litigants in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989) (detailing the use of selective publication plans by appeals courts).
9 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 277-78, 297-339. The authors assign more
specific responsibility to those whom they denominate the "Judicial Establishment." Id. at
277. See generally BAKER, supra note 5, at 287-89 (discussing the circuit judges' role in "reforming" the courts of appeals); SMITH, supra note 6, at 106-13 (exploring the relationship
between systemic changes in the courts and judicial self-interest).
10 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 300-04, 323-25; see also S. REP. No. 197,
supra note 3, at 10 (discussing potential loss of collegiality on large appeals courts); infira
notes 34, 41 and accompanying text (providing additional sources and commentary on
enlarging the bench and collegiality). See generally FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL 213-29
(1994) (describing the workings ofjudicial collegiality at the appellate level).
11

See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 300-02. See generally DAVID M. O'BRIEN,

JUDICIAL ROULT-rTE (1988) (analyzing thejudicial selection process and the candidates chosen); Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitudeand the Federaljudiciay,44 AMt. U. L. REV. 699 (1995)
(reviewing the judicial selection process and its relationship to judicial decisionmaking).
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also find little evidence that collegiality exists today, that a smaller
complement ofjudges would necessarily foster this value, or even that
12
it enhances decisionmaking.
The authors claim that the transformation in the appeals
courts-from a forum treating each case comprehensively to a more
selective system of review-has imposed several disadvantages. This
change has seriously compromised the appellate ideal, has prevented
judges from fulfilling their oaths of office to "administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the
rich,"13 and has amended the statutory appeal as of right.14 The writers contend that circuit judges have evinced greater concern for lawmaking than error correction, while the appellate courts have become
de facto certiorari, not appeals, courts. 15 The authors consider these
developments disturbing, and implore Congress to increase substantially the number of appellate judgeships.
B.

Areas of Agreement

There is widespread consensus about numerous aspects of the
writers' descriptive account of the appellate courts' transformation.
For example, circuitjudges with perspectives as diverse as Judge Edith
Jones and Judge Stephen Reinhardt 16 and blue-ribbon commissions
on the federal courts, such as the Federal Courts Study Committee
and the Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference
12 See Richman & Reynolds, supranote 1, at 323-25; see also infranote 41 and accompanying text (providing additional sources and commentary on collegiality).
13
28 U.S.C. § 458 (1994) (judicial oath of office); seeRichman & Reynolds, supranote
1, at 293-97; see also BAKER, supra note 5, at 287 (describing the differences between the
appellate ideal and appellate reality); Kenneth W. Starr, The Courts of Appeals and the Future
of the FederalJudiciary,1991 Wis. L. REv. 1, 3 (expressing concern about the health of appellate traditions and ideals).
14 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 293-94; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994)
(granting the statutory right of appeal); infra notes 24, 31 and accompanying text (providing additional sources and commentary on whether the appeal as of right has been
amended). See generally Harlan Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE LJ. 62 (1985) (evaluating the purpose of the appeal as of right and its meaning); Donald P. Lay, A Proposalfor DiscretionaryReview in FederalCourts of Appeals, 34 Sw. LJ.
1151, 1155 (1981) (advocating a modification of the appeal as of right).
15 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 293-97; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994)
("The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States .... ."). See generally Paul D. Carrington, The Function of
the Civil AppeaL. A Late Centuy View, 38 S.C. L. REv. 411, 417-28 (1987) (arguing that the
courts of appeal have changed into "juniorSupreme Courts" evincing greater concern for
lawmaking and becoming de facto certiorari courts); Starr, supranote 13, at 2-7 (detailing
the increased caseloads and responsibilities of federal appellate courts, particularly relating
to lawmaking and published opinions).
16 SeeEdith H.Jones, Back to the Futurefor FederalAppeals Courts: RationingFederalJustice
by RecoveringLimitedJurisdiction,73 TEx. L. REv. 1485 (1995) (book review); Stephen Reinhardt, Surveys Without Solutions: Another Study of the United States Courts of Appeals, 73 Tax. L.
Rv. 1505 (1995) (book review).
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of the United States,17 agree that expanding appellate dockets have
substantially modified the appeals courts over the last quarter-century.
Most appellate courts and circuitjudges recognize that they have
promulgated and applied measures which alter the traditional treatment of appeals. These measures include limitations on oral argument and on published opinions, which are frequently codified in
local rules of appellate procedure, and somewhat enhanced reliance
on support staff to resolve cases.18 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit proudly
touts the implementation of many such mechanisms, which have
yielded greater efficiencies, as a compelling argument against splitting
the court.' 9 Certain judges, such as Chief Judge Harry Edwards and
Chief Judge Richard Posner, as well as other federal court observers,
have also acknowledged that the appeals courts are becoming increas20
ingly bureaucratized and have warned of the risks posed.
There is considerable agreement with much else which the authors describe. One helpful illustration is the limited likelihood that
Congress will circumscribe federal criminal or civil jurisdiction. 2 ' Few
observers dispute that senators and representatives cannot resist the
essentially cost-free political mileage derived from federalizing additional criminal activity and from recognizing new civil causes of ac17

See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (1990) [hereinafter REPORT
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE]; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,

LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 41-42 (1995), reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49, 101-02

(1996).
18 See, e.g., lST CIR. R. 36.1,36.2; 4TH CIR. R. 34(a), 36; 7TH CIR. R. 84(f), 53; Arthur D.
Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REv.
937 (1980); Patricia McGowan Wald, The Problem With the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy,or
Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 776-79 (1983). See generally BAKER, supra
note 5, at 108-17, 119-35, 139-47 (detailing the appeals courts' curtailment of oral argument and increased reliance on staff).
19 See, e.g., Office of the Circuit Executive for the United States Courts for the Ninth
Circuit, PositionPaperin Opposition to S. 956, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ReorganizationAct
of 1995 (12/7/95) and Companion Bill H.R. 2935 (2/1/96), (San Francisco, Ca.), March 7,
1996, at 1, 4 [hereinafter S. 956 PositionPaper]; see also S. REP. No. 197, supra note 3, at 2728 (describing reforms within the Ninth Circuit that have purportedly increased efficiency). But see S. REP. No. 197, supra note 3, at 4. See generallyJOE S. CECIL, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: THE NINTH

CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (1985) (evaluating the administrative reforms within the

Ninth Circuit).
20

See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 26-28 (1985);

Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy"of the FederalCourts: A
Causation-BasedApproach to the Searchfor AppropriateRemedies, 68 IOwA L. REv. 871, 918-19
(1983); see also Wade H. McCree, Jr., BureaucraticJustice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L.
REv. 777 (1981) (expressing concerns about the effects of bureaucracy on the quality of
the judicial work product); Wald, supra note 18 (describing the phenomenon ofjudicial

bureacratization). See generallySMrrH, supra note 6, at 94-125 (discussing systemic problems
arising from bureaucracy).
21 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 325-30. But seeJones, supra note 16, at
1486, 1499-1504.

THE NEW CERTIORAR1

1996]
tion. 22

1269

This proposition assumes even greater force, now that

economic concerns and budgetary restraints have made less feasible
formerly successful means of cultivating constituents, such as creating
entitlements.
Insofar as the transformation can be said to have amended the
statutory right of appeal and narrowed access, particularly for parties
who have little resources or power, most experts concur that these
changes should not occur by default. 2 3 Rather, the alterations ought
to be instituted only after careful consideration of relevant modifications and their benefits and disadvantages, of possible alternatives,
and of the tradeoffs implicated as well as open, candid decisions by
those, namely Congress, with responsibility for applicable
policymaking.
C. Areas of Less Consensus
There is less consensus about, and some controversy accompanying, certain elements of the authors' descriptive assessment. fllustrative is the writers' assertion that many cases, especially those pursued
by appellants with limited resources or power, have not received the
review which they require. 24 Quite a few judges have questioned
whether numerous appeals need, or would benefit from, greater attention, while all of the regional circuits have treated some cases differently. 25

More

consideration

might not improve appellate

decisionmaking generally or the outcomes in many specific appeals
22
See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, AdministeringJusticein the First Circui4 24 SUFFOLK U. L.
Ray. 29, 34-37 (1990); Kathleen F. Brickey, CriminalMischief. The Federalizationof American
Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1135 (1995); William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical
Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 719, 722-25 (1995); Tobias, supra note 3, at 1404; see also infra
notes 28-31 and accompanying text (providing examples of Congress's role in expanding

federal courtjurisdiction). See generally WIAM W. ScmvAwzER & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ON
THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINALJUSTICE (FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, LONG RANGE PLANNING SERIES, PUB. No. 2, 1994) (outlining the debate sur-

rounding the federalization of state civil claims and criminal prosecutions).
23
See Richman & Reynolds, supranote 1. at 277, 295-97; see also supranote 14 (providing sources which advocate thoughtful analysis of the appeal as of right). But cf infranotes
24, 31 (suggesting that transformation has not amended the statutory right of appeal).
24 See supranotes 6-8 and accompanying text. The writers argue that the transformation has amended the statutory appeal as of right. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1,
at 293. However, appellate resolution without the full panoply of procedures is not tantamount to revision. SeeDANIELJ. MEADOR, CRIMINAL APPEALS: ENGLISH PRACTICES AND AMERiCAN REFORMS (1973); see also infra note 31 (detailing arguments for and against the view
that the statutory right of appeal is amended). See generally DANIELJ. MEADOR, APPELLATE
COURTS STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME 168-71 (1974) (comparing "appeals as
of right" in "discretionary courts" and in "obligatory-review courts"); Dalton, supra note 14
(assessing the rationales for and the role of appeal as of right).
25
See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 22, at 32-33; Donald P. Lay, Reconciling Tradition With
Reality: The Expedited Appeal, 23 UCLA L. RFy. 419 (1976). Examples of measures that
prescribe differential treatment are in supranote 18; infra note 30.
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which judges now address less thoroughly.2 6 These particular cases
include (i) a number of social security appeals that raise clearly-settled
questions of law or that involve only factual issues which received multiple levels of review and (ii) numerous pro se cases that parties might
27
not have filed had counsel been consulted.
Less agreement also attends the authors' assignment to the federal bench of major responsibility for the transformation. This attribution seems unwarranted because several sources, most notably
Congress, have created, or could have substantially affected, important dimensions of that modification, while the appellate judiciary has
apparently played a narrower role than Richman and Reynolds
suggest.
Senators and representatives actually contributed to significant
aspects of the transformation and had considerable responsibility for,
or might have influenced, other features. A valuable example is the
nearly continuous passage of statutes that have expanded federal district court criminal and civil jurisdiction since the 1960s. This legislative activity has directly contributed to and propelled critical changes,
namely rising dockets.28 Congress failed to stop or temper the development by authorizing, for instance, sufficient, additional judges to
treat the increased appeals which resulted. 29
Senators and representatives even had some responsibility for local circuit procedures that limited appellate review because Congress
did not modify several amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure which facilitated the local requirements' adoption. 30 In26 Full review, therefore, may represent a less than optimal use of scarce resources of
the appellate system, lawyers, and litigants. But see Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at
304-07 (criticizing the argument that additional judgeships are too expensive).
27 According many appeals greater attention may also entail certain disadvantages,
such as imposing more burdensome duties on court staff. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. The ideas in this paragraph seem to warrant more refined analysis of cases'
differential needs and solutions thereto. See infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., Violent Grime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223 (1995)); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994)). See generally Carolyn Dineen King, A Matter of Conscience, 28 Hous. L. REv. 955,
956-57 (1991) (identifying passage of legislation beginning in the 1960s as cause of increased caseload); Judith Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI.
L. REv. 494, 514, 518, 526 (1986) (same). Some statutes specifically authorize direct appeals to the appellate courts of agency decisions. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1276 (1994); 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1994).
29 Since 1978, Congress has passed several acts authorizing many newjudgeships. See
Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978); Starr, supra note 13, at 2. See
generallyWitLIAM P. McLAuCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 107 (1984) (concluding that
the trend of adding judges reduced caseload per judge or per panel, but only delayed what
appeared to be nearly inexorable rise in appeals pursued). However, the number proved
inadequate to treat the increasing appeals. Id.
30 See, e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 34.2, 47.5, 47.6; 6TH CI. R. 24; 9 TH CIR. R. 34, 36; 10H CIR. R.
36.1, 36.3 and FED. R. App. P. 33's 1994 amendment and FED. R. App. P. 34's 1979 amend-
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deed, few senators or representatives have expressly acknowledged
that mounting caseloads and ameliorative measures aimed at the
dockets might have revised statutory appeal as of right.3 1
The appeals court bench may correspondingly have played a less
important role in the transformation than Richman and Reynolds
claim. For example, numerous judges, including Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Judge Patricia McGowan Wald, have voiced clear concern about the very changes-shrinking appellate access and thejudiciary's increasing bureaucratization-which Richman and Reynolds
decry and have suggested responses that resemble the authors' proposed remedy. 32 The Ninth Circuit and the Judicial Conference are
seeking ten additional positions for the court, while the Conference
sent to Congress last year draft legislation that would authorize twenty
temporary appellate judgeships. 33 A few members of the bench have
specifically called for enlarging their numbers, and Judge Reinhardt
even importuned senators and representatives in 1993 to double the
circuit judiciary's size, a recommendation which apparently
34
prefigured the writers' prescription.
ment. Circuitjudges were primarily responsible for adopting local circuit rules, but Congress now monitors proposals to amend the national appellate rules rather closely. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (1994). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1018-20 (1982) (tracing the history of the Rules Enabling Act
which prescribed the national rule revision process and suggesting increased tendency of
Congress to intervene in process). Congress even had some responsibility for local circuit
rules which it could have abrogated; however, Congress had insufficient time to do so and
assigned primary responsibility for review and abrogation to judicial bodies. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2071(a), (c) (2) (1994).
31
Somejudges and writers find that the caseloads and measures have changed appeal
as of right. See, e.g., supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text; infra note 32 and accompanying text. But cf. supranote 24 (suggesting appellate resolution without full procedures is
not tantamount to revising statutory appeal of right). Congress's delegation to the judiciary of responsibility for defining finality and interlocutory appeals through rule revision
may suggest its views on this issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994). Numerous individuals,
such as prisoners seeking to vindicate civil rights, whom Congress intended to benefit by
recognizing new civil causes of action, ironically are the parties whose access the transformation has apparently limited. See supra notes 13, 24. See generally Carl Tobias, PublicLaw
Litigationand the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. Rlv. 270 (1989) (concluding
that the enforcement by many courts of the Federal Rules has adversely affected public
interest litigants).
32 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Rejlections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload
ofFederalfudges,55 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1983); Alvin B. Rubin, Views From the Lower Cour 23
UCLA L. Rsv. 448 (1976); Wald, supra note 18; see also supra note 20 and accompanying
text (discussing judges' acknowledgement of the increased bureaucratization of appeals
courts and the risks posed). I realize that I am treating descriptions by invoking prescriptions; however, they are sufficiently important to warrant inclusion here.
33 SeeJudicial Conference of the U.S.,JudicialConferenceActs on Cameras in Court (Mar.
12, 1996); Tobias, supra note 3, at 1411; see also S. REP. No. 197, supra note 3, at 6 (arguing
that the Ninth Circuit's request for ten more judgeships renders the proposal to split the
circuit especially urgent).
34 See Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too Many
Cases, A.BAJ.,Jan. 1993, at 52-54. But seeJon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-TheLimit ForAn
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The bench did contribute to certain dimensions of the transformation, although district, not appellate, judges deserve greater credit.
For instance, many additional appeals resulted from broad construction of federal constitutional, statutory, and procedural provisions in
areas such as habeas corpus, civil and prisoner rights, and criminal
law.3 5 Trial judges issued numerous interpretations, some of which
were fact-bound, and thus contributed significantly to the
development.
The district courts concomitantly had substantial responsibility
for the dramatic rise in trial court litigation and corresponding appeals that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encouraged.3 6 District
judges contributed greatly to the liberal regime, which pervaded the
original 1938 Rules and continued in most subsequent amendments,
and to those provisions' flexible, pragmatic application.3 7 The Rules,
as written and enforced, enhanced plaintiffs' ability to commence
cases, conduct full discovery, and reach the merits, while facilitating
the pursuit of numerous trial court actions and consequent appellate
filings. 38 Finally, the appellate courts had much responsibility for the
adoption and implementation of measures which limited access for
the increasing numbers of appeals that arose. 3 9
Effective FederalJudiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187, 188 (1993) (arguing against expanding the
federal judiciary); Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.BA J., July 1993, at 70
(same). See generallyGORDON BFgmAiNr Er AL., FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERALJUDGES: AN ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS

(1993) (summarizing arguments for and against capping the number of federal district
and circuitjudgeships); King, supranote 28, at 958-60 (discussing why manyjudges oppose
increasing the number ofjudgeships).
35 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosauror Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. RLv.
1, 5-7 (1984); Resnik, supra note 28, at 516-17; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text
(suggesting Congress passed statutes which contributed). The judiciary, which broadly
read those provisions, can arguably reconsider and construe restrictively some of them
because circumstances have changed or to promote fairness or efficiency.
36 See, e.g., Resnik, supranote 28, at 498-507; Tobias, supra note 31, at 271-96; Stephen
C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences ofModern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 631, 64666.
37 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 35, at 8-9; Tobias, supranote 31, at 271-96; see also Carl
Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990JudicialImprovements Acts, 46 STAN. L. Rxv. 1589, 159298, 1606-17 (1994) (finding that the 1983 and 1993 revisions partially altered the regime).
38 See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival ofFact PleadingUnder theFederalRules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 439-40 (1986); Miller, supra note 35, at 8-9; Maurice
Rosenberg, FederalRules of CivilProcedurein Action: Assessing TheirImpact, 137 U. PA. L. R-v.
2197, 2202-07 (1989).
39 See supra notes 18, 30 and accompanying text. Many sources other than judges
contributed to the transformation. A few were as general as the changing nature of legal
practice. See Miller, supra note 35; Resnik, supra note 28, at 515-39. A more specific factor
was the rise of litigators. See Miller, supranote 35, at 3-4. Another was parties' increasing
willingness to appeal. See CAROL KRAFsrA Er AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STALKING THE
INCREASE IN THE RATE OF FEDERAL CIVIL APPEALS (1995); Campbell, supra note 4, at 293-96;
Yeazell, supra note 36, at 639-40. A few, such as the widespread use of duplicating equipment, may initially have seemed rather innocuous. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Con-
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Less consensus accompanies certain criticisms of the judiciary by
Richman and Reynolds. Illustrative are reasons, which seem more defensible than the authors indicate, why judges oppose enlarging the
bench. Manyjudges and federal courts observers believe that expansion will additionally fracture the fragmented federal law, will impede
the judiciary's federalizing efforts to harmonize the Constitution and
national policies with state and local concerns, 40 and will undermine
collegiality, a value ostensibly promoted by having few judges on circuits.4 1 Thejudiciary's elitism also appears less important to the transformation than the writers claim. Most appellate judges are
conscientious, dedicated jurists who discharge the burdensome responsibilities to resolve substantial caseloads promptly, inexpensively,
and fairly. The perceived need for such disposition, rather than elitism, may explain the decision to spend greater resources on appeals
which seem to require more treatment. 42
Some of the authors' assertions appear controversial because relatively little empirical data seem to support their contentions. The
quintessential example is the writers' central assumption that many
cases pursued by appellants with limited economic or political power
receive inadequate attention.4 3 The authors' surmise is problematic
because compelling empirical information should support change as
significant as that which the writers champion.
Some of the authors' assumptions actually appear counterintuitive. For instance, it seems more plausible that prisoners, who have
quered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedurein HistoricalPerspective 135 U. PA. L.
REv. 909, 912 (1987). See generally THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN

THE FUTURE (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) (examining numerous
problems that contributed to rising caseloads and overburdened judicial system); Miller,
supranote 35 (explaining how the rise in litigation resulted from "changes in the character
and makeup of the legal profession;" for example, the prevalence of word processors).
40 For analysis of fragmentation, see Tjoflat, supranote 34, at 71-73; Tobias, supranote
3, at 1371. For analysis of federalization, see CHARLES ALAN WiucHT, LAw OF FEDERAL

COURTS 10-13 (5th ed. 1994);John Minor Wisdom, Requiem fora Great Court,26 Loy. L. REv.
787, 788 (1980).
41 "Collegiality" is controversial and resists felicitous definition, particularly given
modem realities whereby many appellate judges work on cases out of their own chambers
and communicate principally through written e-mail or by facsimile transmission. It is also
unclear that the bench's expansion would reduce collegiality and, even if it did, that collegiality improves appellate resolution. For analysis of collegiality, see The Ninth Circuit
Split: Hearing on S. 956 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciay, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1995) (statement of Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit)
[hereinafter O'Scannlain Statement]; S. REP. No. 197, supra note 3, at 10; see also COFFIN,
supra note 10, at 213-29; Tjoflat, supra note 34, at 70.
42 See Newman, supra note 34; Lauren K. Robel, Caseload andjudging: JudicialAdaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REav 3, 5-6, 37-47. See generally Howard T. Markey, On the
PresentDeteriorationof the FederalAppellateProcess: Never Another LearnedHand,33 S.D. L. REv.
371 (1988) (discussing howjudges feel compelled to delegate much responsibility to staff
members in response to the "caseload crisis").
43 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 275-76.
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much to gain and nothing to lose, would evaluate the possibility of
appeal less rigorously than paying parties who typically undertake
cost-benefit analyses. Indeed, a 1995 Federal Judicial Center study
found that district judges grant a tiny percentage of prisoner petitions
and dismiss most prisoner cases on procedural grounds, and the "high
rate of appeal from [those] terminations suggests that many of these
appeals raise issues that are untimely or addressed by well-established
legal precedent."' It appears equally probable that pro se litigants
would more readily appeal cases which lawyers, drawing on legal training and objectivity, would consider meritless. If these ideas are correct, they explain as well as the writers' surmise why prisoner and pro
se appeals receive summary treatment much more often than securities cases. Some evidence even conflicts with the authors' assumption.
For example, a brief search reveals numerous unpublished opinions
in which panels, absent oral argument, reversed district courts that
too peremptorily dismissed complaints filed by prisoners or unrepresented parties. 45 There are also a number of unpublished decisions in
which appeals courts scrutinized, but ultimately affirmed, claims that
were frivolous. 46 This material may lack strong empirical support;
however, the many cases which seem to contradict the writers' surmise
are troubling. Repetition of an assumption should not be a substitute
for empirical evidence. In the final analysis, the authors' major hypothesis requires greater empirical substantiation.
In sum, Richman and Reynolds have thoroughly examined the
transformation in the appellate courts and its ramifications. This assessment should alert the Congress, the federal judiciary, the legal
community, and the public to what has happened so that they may
44
KRAFKA ET AL., supra note 39, at 18. The authors cite VICTOR E. FLANGO, HABEAS
CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 61-65 (1994) and ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K.
DALEY, CHALLENGING THE CONDITIONS OF PRISONS AND JAILS: A REPORT ON SECTION 1983
LITIGATION 36 (BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS 1995) for the district court findings, KRAFiA
ET AL., supra, at 18 n.8, and were "aware of no similar studies of appeals in prisoner cases,"

id. at 18. See also Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the
FederalCourts, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 11, 27-28 & n.91 (affording reasons for increase in criminal
and habeas appeals).
45 See, e.g., Allen v. Figueroa, No. 93-15848, 1995 WL 314704 (9th Cir. May 23, 1995);
Deas v. Deas, No. 95-15023, 1995 WL 139235 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 1995); Wood v. Avenenti,
No. 93-15946, 1995 WL 128224 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 1995); Hines v. Brown, No. 94-15721,
1995 WL 72371 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 1995); Wolde-Giorgis v. Arizona State DOT, No. 9415215, 1995 WL 11085 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 1995). It bears emphasizing that this search involved one appeals court in a single year. See infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text
(suggesting need for refined sense of exact nature of discrepancies in appellatejustice that
authors found and other issues they raised, which collection, analysis, and synthesis of empirical data by study commission might afford).
46
See, e.g., Menefield v. Helsel, No. 94-16036, 1996 WL 109404 (9th Cir. Mar. 12,
1996);Jenks v. Hull, No. 94-15268, 1995 WL 574518 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 1995); see also Cato
v. United States, Nos. 94-17102, 94-17104, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 1995); Trimble v.
City of Santa Rosa, No. 94-15567, 49 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1995).
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respond. The writers have described important modifications in the
appeals courts, and considerable agreement attends most aspects of
their account.
II
PRESCRIPTION

A.

Commentary on the Authors' Prescription

Much more complex, and even controversial, is how best to address the transformation and its implications. The authors' solution
of creating numerous new judgeships would address certain phenomena which are attributable to mounting caseloads. However, appellate
docket growth derives from multiple sources, and some have responsibility which equals or surpasses that of the federal judiciary.4 7 Moreover, the writers' remedy might not be the preferable way to resolve a
number of problems ascribed to multiplying caseloads and numerous
additional difficulties which the appeals courts confront Most significantly, these complications constitute a polycentric problem that apparently warrants application of a finely-calibrated mix of many
potential solutions, only one of which is the bench's expansion.4 The
authors' approach by itself could concomitantly create disadvantages,
might be less effective than a number of other measures, and may be
politically unrealistic.
First, implementation of the authors' prescription could have detrimental consequences, although it might be responsive to the transformation's impact that the writers consider most troubling:
discrepancies in the appellate access which litigants with disparate resources or power receive. Increases in the judiciary of the size that the
authors recommend would impose both predictable and unforeseeable disadvantages. For example, enlarging the bench would reduce
the collegiality offered by having rather few judges on appeals courts
and, therefore, limit its purported benefit, expediting the resolution
49
of appeals.
The writers' proposed remedy might also require division of the
twelve regional circuits and the establishment of approximately eight
new appellate courts.5 0 This could further splinter the already balkan47

48

See, e.g., supranotes 28-31 and accompanying text.
It is important to emphasize that the problems posed by docket growth and other

difficulties facing the circuits are polycentric. This attribute complicates identification of
efficacious solutions and counsels against single or narrow solutions, such as thejudiciary's
expansion, because they will be incomplete and could impose disadvantages. See Lon L.
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 394-404 (1978); Yeazell,
supra note 36, at 676-78; infra notes 94, 96 and accompanying text.

49 See supra notes 12, 41 and accompanying text.
50 I premise this on the increase in judges that the authors suggest. See Richman &
Reynolds, supranote 1, at 297-98 & n.126; see alsoBAKER, supranote 5, at 239-42 (exploring
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ized federal law and increase the potential for multiple interpretations
of provisions in the Constitution, congressional statutes, and procedural requirements. Moreover, intercircuit conflicts would be more
likely, increasing the demands on the Supreme Court.5 ' The greater
uncertainty and apparently enhanced opportunities for securing
favorable rulings thus engendered might well encourage more district
52
court litigation, additional appeals, and forum shopping.
Expanding the number of appeals courts would correspondingly
complicate the bench's efforts to reconcile the Constitution and national concerns with state and local policies. 53 The creation of many
appellate judgeships and new appeals courts would also entail important, one-time expenses associated with appointing the judges, as well
as certain ongoing costs. 54 Substantially enlarging the judiciary would

invariably require more complex structures, and these in turn would
impair the pursuit of appeals by litigants who have little power or
money.
According increased attention to appeals of parties with limited
political or economic power-the major reason why the authors propose that Congress approve new judgeships-could have adverse effects.55 Most significantly, providing such treatment might not
enhance decisionmaking generally or improve results in particular
56
cases and, thus, could be unnecessary and waste scarce resources.
similar numbers and circuit division). Combining the existing circuits into "jumbo"courts
is a possibility. SeeJ. Clifford Wallace, The Casefor Large FederalCourts of Appeals, 77 JuDmcATURE 288 (1994);Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Disconnecting the Overloaded Circuits-A Plugfor a Unified Court of Appeals, 39 ST. Louis U. LJ. 455 (1995).
51
See Tobias, supra note 3, at 1369-71; O'Scannlain Statement, supranote 41, at 5-6.
52 See Tjoflat, supra note 34, at 71; S. 956 Position Paper,supra note 19, at 2. More
appeals courts could differently construe procedures in the Federal Rules of Appellate,
Civil, and Criminal Procedure and in Title 28 of the United States Code and could adopt
diverse local appellate rules. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of AppellateJustice: The
Proliferationof Local Rules in theFederal Circuits,67 U. CoLo. L. REX'. (forthcoming Fall 1996).
See also supra note 28. Trial and appellate forum shopping might result. See generally
Thomas 0. McGarity, Multi-PartyForum ShoppingforAppellate Review of AdministrativeAction,
129 U. PA. L. REv. 302 (1980) (arguing that the "race to the courthouse" method of appellate forum selection is inappropriate).
53 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. As appeals courts encompass fewer
states, their shrinking size may well reduce the breadth of experience and perspective that
the nation currently expects of the federal appellate bench and, therefore, erode another
important purpose of the federal courts-providing an impartial forum for out-of-state
litigants.
54 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 304-07. Illustrative are annual operating
expenses for stafL such as judges' law clerks, and costs of creating new clerk of court and
circuit executive offices, of other support staff, and of constructing or remodeling courthouses. See S. REP. No. 197, supranote 3, at 24-25; S. 956 Position Paper,supranote 19, at 4;
see also infra note 59 (discussing the creation of a new fourth tier and the costs thereof).
55 I already mentioned several such effects; however, they are sufficiently important to
warrant treatment here. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
56
See supranote 26 and accompanying text; see also supranotes 18, 25, 30 and accompanying text (finding that judges apparently found more attention so unwarranted that
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For example, little purpose may be served by holding oral argument
in the fifth social security appeal which raises a legal issue identical to
one decided in four earlier cases, or in pro se appeals that involve only
frivolous legal contentions. Affording large numbers of cases greater
attention could also impose direct economic expenses. For instance,
complete appellate review would increase the workloads of circuit staff
in the offices of the clerks of court. Those personnel would have to
treat numerous appeals through additional stages, in which the employees, lawyers, and litigants would participate in more activities, in57
cluding oral argument, to final disposition.
Some ideas that Richman and Reynolds espouse are responsive to
certain questions which I raise. For example, the writers find the importance of collegiality overstated because minimal actual collegiality
exists today even on appellate courts with relatively few judges, and
the collegiality that remains offers little true benefit.58 The authors
also propose the establishment of another tier of courts, the creation
of which would probably speak to additional concerns, such as the
potential for increased fragmentation of federal law.5 9
A second, related reason why the writers' recommendation to enlarge the judiciary might not be the best approach is that many existing remedies alone, but especially in combination, appear to treat
more effectively the problems ascribed to docket growth and numerous other complications which the appellate courts face. These solutions would specifically address a number of difficulties attributed to
rising caseloads as well as, and resolve additional problems that the
appeals courts confront better than, expanding the bench.
One effective measure, which might be particularly responsive to
discrepancies in appellate access identified by the authors, would be
they codified differential treatment in local rules). More attention would also multiply the
quantity of precedent and might increase inconsistency and appeals' costs.
57 Some savings might be realized because other personnel, such as staff attorneys,
would have fewer responsibilities to review cases, such as prisoner appeals, which formerly

received summary resolution. See also infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (suggesting
that Congress is unlikely to support expansion of the judiciary); infranote 91 (recognizing
that the important value of litigant satisfaction may be lost).
58 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 328-25; see also Starr, supra note 13, at 2
(discussing wane of 7th Circuit collegiality); Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National
Court, 48 U. MrAMi L. R.v. 159, 169-70, 181 (1993) (same as to D.C. Circuit); Stephen L.
Wasby, Internal Communication in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 583
(1980) (same as to 8th Circuit); supra notes 10, 12, 41, 49 and accompanying text (discussing collegiality).
59 See BAKER, supra note 5, at 242-61; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 307-08.
The tier's creation could increase cost and delay, even in cases not receiving four levels of
review, disadvantage litigants with little resources or power, increase intracircuit inconsistency, and prove less realistic than the appellate bench's expansion. See Baker, supra note
3, at 954; Tobias, supra note 3, at 1397-98. See also supra notes 40, 51 and accompanying
text.
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to place greater reliance on judges and courts with limited, subject
matter jurisdiction. 60 For instance, these judges or tribunals might
decide expeditiously, inexpensively, and fairly appeals of social security cases and challenges involving similar government entitlement programs. More particularly, the courts and judges could promote equity
by increasing access, and they would probably possess or develop substantive and procedural expertise that might foster prompter,
cheaper, or fairer resolutions. 6 1 These and somewhat analogous
mechanisms, which numerous appellate courts have instituted and
Congress has recently passed, might facilitate the similar disposition
of many prisoner appeals that constitute a significant percentage of
62
most appeals courts' dockets.

Another approach, which could also be responsive to the disparities identified by the writers, would be to provide legal representation
for the many pro se cases that might benefit from such assistance.
Several sources, including the Legal Services Corporation and law
school clinical programs, might supply this representation, which
should facilitate pro se litigants' pursuit of appeals by more clearly
63
articulating their claims.
Professor Thomas E. Baker, who has comprehensively assessed
the appellate system, recently developed a third possibility. 64 He suggested that Congress create twenty appeals courts, comprising nine
judges each, and place responsibility for error correction under Rules
60
See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 17, at 120-21;
Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of
Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. Rv. 542, 604-12 (1969); Daniel J. Meador, A
Challenge tofudicialArchitecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 603 (1989).

61

The authors approve of these courts and judges but caution that they might be

narrow and subject to "capture." Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 319-20 & n.224; see
also S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, The Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional
Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model 39 AM. U. L. RE,. 853 (1990)
(analyzing subject matter courts and the Federal Circuit). The courts could also institutionalize resource-based inequities and prevent parties from vindicating rights in a public
forum before an Article I Ijudge. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
62 See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,

110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.CA § 2241 (1996)); NINTH CIRCUITJUDICIAL COUNCIL,
1994 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (1994); see also Felker v. Turpin, 116

S. Ct. 2333 (upholding constitutionality of provision of Act governing habeas corpus), reh'g
denied, 117 S. Ct. 25 (1996); Caseload Increases Throughout Judiciay, THIRD BRANCH, Mar.
1996, at 1, 2 (stating that 40% of 1995 appeals nationally were pro se and that most were
prisoner petitions); supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing prisoner appeals); infra note 87 (suggesting reliance on other countries' experiences with specialized
courts and judges).
63 These ideas are here for purposes of discussion and may be as politically unrealistic
today as the authors' suggestion. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
64 Telephone conversation with Professor Thomas E. Baker, Texas Tech University
School of Law (Mar. 15, 1996) [hereinafter Baker Conversation]; see also BAKER, supra note
5 (assessing the appellate system).
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59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in threejudge district courts. From Adverse determinations of these courts, parties
could then file certiorari petitions with threejudge appellate panels,
and, thus, capitalize on the greater judicial capacity in the district
courts.

65

In short, many potential solutions that appear equally effective as
enlarging the judiciary presently exist. Despite the availability of numerous remedies, it is difficult to predict all of the benefits and disadvantages of applying specific solutions, much less how multiple
techniques would operate together, and, therefore, precisely what mix
of options would be most effective.
A third significant reason why expanding the bench might not be
preferable is that it is politically unrealistic. 66 The ongoing controversy over splitting the Ninth Circuit and considerable activity of the
104th Congress illustrate that senators and representatives are unlikely to authorize more judges, especially on the order of magnitude
recommended by Richman and Reynolds. For example, sponsors of
the recent proposal to bifurcate the Ninth Circuit have not broached
the prospect of augmenting the court's membership, although this
possibility would clearly facilitate the measure's passage. No senator
or representative has introduced a bill which would create additional
judgeships for the appeals court, even though Senator Slade Gorton
(R-Wash.), the foremost advocate of dividing the circuit, acknowledged that the court's caseload would have justified ten more judges
in 1990,67 the Ninth CircuitJudicial Council requested those positions

during 1992, and the Judicial Conference asked Congress to authorize
ten additional members in 1993.68
Factors which implicate the Ninth Circuit less expressly also indicate little legislative support for enlarging the judiciary. For instance,
a Congress that has expended enormous energy debating the future
of certain government entitlements, which many parties with limited
65 See Newman, supranote 34, at 187 n.1 (noting that "There are currently 649 district
judges and 179 circuitjudges .... ."). This idea efficiently and realistically treats deficient
judicial resources and would foster collegiality, but it could further fragment the fractured
federal law and erode courts' federalizing responsibility. See supranote 40 and accompanying text. For a thorough catalog of solutions, see BAKER, supra note 5, at 106-279. See also
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrTEE, supra note 17, at 116-24 (analyzing

similar proposals); Tobias, supranote 3, at 1396-1404 (listing structural alternatives to the
current federal court system).
66 This alone would not be a compelling reason to criticize a suggested solution to the

polycentric problem. Even if Congress eschews the authors' proposal, it could provoke
discussion and lead to adoption of an effective remedy. My concern is that proposed solutions have a realistic prospect for being implemented and resolving the problem.
67 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ReorganizationAct of 1989: Hearingon S. 948 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 19 (1990) [hereinafter Hearingon S. 948] (position paper of Sen. Slade Gorton).
68
See supranote 33 and accompanying text.
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economic and political power seek to secure or protect on appeal,
would probably not approve more judges who would resolve numer69
ous cases involving those entitlements.
Fiscal constraints also make the authorization of substantial numbers of additional judgeships politically unrealistic.7 0 Senators and
representatives who have devoted nearly an entire session to budgetcutting as a matter of principle might not approve many new judgeships, much less establish an entirely new fourth tier of courts, even if
they deemed either action advisable on the merits. Congress has
evinced growing reluctance to fund the Judicial 7Branch and has increasingly scrutinized its appropriations requests. '
Assuming that senators and representatives were more amenable
than they now are to the bench's expansion, judicial opposition to this
option makes its realization even more improbable. Congress appears
unlikely to enlarge the judiciary in the face of resistance from numerous members of a coordinate branch of the federal government who
are uniquely situated to predict the ramifications of, and could be sig72
nificantly affected by, that action.
Many ideas above-especially the adverse impacts which might
attend implementation of the authors' recommendation and my selective assessment of comparatively promising solutions-suggest that
the polycentric problem posed by mounting appellate dockets and numerous other difficulties which circuits experience would probably respond best to a sophisticated mix of the available measures. Although
expanding the bench is one alternative, a number of the other options individually, and particularly in concert, seem more promising.
Notwithstanding the existence of many potential remedies, it remains
unclear exactly what combination of solutions would be most effective. However, the study proposed below could identify that mix
which would be preferable.

69

Similar ideas apply to litigation which prisoners pursue. See supra notes 61-62 and

accompanying text. The Republican Party, which dominates both houses in the 104th
Congress, also would not create manyjudicial posts that a Democratic president would fill.
See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
70
71
See Mark Hansen, CourtSpending Under Riew, A.BAJ., Feb. 1996, at 24; William H.
Rehnquist, Year-End Report on theJudiciary,reprinted injudiciaryMakes Its Case in Chief LEGAL
TIMES,Jan. 8, 1996, at 12. The controversy over the Ninth Circuit suggests that Congress is
willing to fund the courts, but division's expense was so important that its proponents
downplayed the costs. They also never proposed the creation of more judgeships. See
supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
72 This would implicate the delicate interbranch relationship. See Carl Tobias, Judicial
Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 933, 961
(1991). Not all judges oppose increases. See, e.g., supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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National Study Commission

Numerous concepts examined already show that Congress should
authorize a national commission to evaluate the appeals court system.
Illustrative are the lack of consensus about the complications that are
ascribed to multiplying caseloads, the many other problems that circuits confront, and the optimal combination of remedies for all of
these difficulties.
Some factors which more directly implicate Congress suggest the
advisability of creating an entity to study the appellate courts. Senators and representatives generally have insufficient time, interest, and
expertise to collect, analyze, and synthesize those data that are relevant to the circuits. They also cannot identify the most urgent
problems affecting the appeals courts, designate potential solutions,
or delineate the best mix of options. The press of day-to-day legislative business simply precludes Congress from reflecting on the complex policy issues-involving constitutional theory, delicate
interbranch relationships, and pragmatic politics-that are in question. Indeed, during 1989, Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Or.) astutely declared that "[f] or too long, the problems facing the Ninth Circuit, and
the entire federal court system for that matter, have not received the
thoughtful attention of Congress and [the] public discussion they
73
deserve."
These concerns demonstrate the critical need, which a commission might satisfy, for senators and representatives to appreciate the
compelling importance of the difficulties ascribed to mounting
caseloads and other complications that appellate courts encounter.
They also indicate the necessity for implementing effective remedies
before the problems overwhelm the appeals courts or further compromise the appellate ideal. A commission, particularly by focusing the
salient matters for legislative consideration, may assist senators and
representatives in candidly confronting, rigorously struggling with,
and carefully resolving the vexing issues of policy. These issues include such matters as whether numerous appeals require greater
treatment and, if so, what that treatment should be.
More specifically, Congress is responsible for certain difficulties
attributed to growing dockets and for additional complications that
appellate courts experience, while senators and representatives could
73
See Hearingon S. 948, supra note 67, at 250 (statement of Senator Hatfield). Congress may deem the intermnediate courts insufficiently important to warrant the type of
attention needed to rectify the relevant problems. For example, Congress has yet to act on
a study of the appellate system which it commissioned. See Federal Courts Study Act, Pub.
L. No. 100-702, § 101, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994)); see

also FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS (1993)

[hereinafter FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER].
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address effectively these and other problems that the courts face.
Symptomatic is Congress's virtually uninterrupted, three-decade expansion of civil and criminal jurisdiction, and its corresponding failure to treat the resulting surge in appeals by, for instance, increasing
the number of judges. 74 Finally, Congress may respond more favorably to the findings and recommendations of a commission, especially
if it carefully constituted this entity with significant legislative branch
representation, articulated a clear charge, and allocated adequate resources for intensive research and the compilation of a thorough
report.75
The numerous evaluations of the difficulties attributed to multiplying caseloads, of the additional complications that appeals courts
encounter, and of the many remedies posited-some of which are
mentioned in this essay and are integral to the Richman and Reynolds
critique-indicate that they may have received sufficient examination
and that Congress must now decide on a particular remedy. 76 Moreover, Richman and Reynolds pinpoint relatively specific problems and
77
offer a comparatively particularized prescription.
The considerable uncertainty about the phenomena ascribed to
expanding appeals, numerous other difficulties confronting appellate
courts, and the efficacy of the many available solutions, however,
thwart current legislative efforts to resolve even the rather limited
problems principally implicating docket growth. This lack of clarity
complicates attempts to designate preferable remedies, while it suggests that there may be no single, superior solution, but that the best
approach will probably be a complex, finely-tuned mix of numerous
alternatives. The uncertainty concomitantly indicates that Congress
cannot make decisions which are informed by current, accurate data
and that it should therefore approve a new study.
Certain of the above factors, particularly the polycentric nature of
the conundrum to be solved, also caution against presently applying
the writers' prescription to the relatively narrow problems attributed
to multiplying appeals. The judiciary's expansion is a single remedy
among many, and mounting caseloads are only one of numerous applicable complications. Implementing the authors' solution, therefore, would necessarily leave untreated, and could even exacerbate, a
See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
Some of the above ideas, such as Congress's lack of time and need to focus, may
seem to conflict; however, this emphasizes the critical need for a commission which could
ameliorate important problems by focusing the critical issues for resolution.
76
See Reinhardt, supranote 16, at 1512; see also BAKER, supra note 5, at 33-43 (summarizing ten recent studies of the growing federal appellate dockets); Thomas E. Baker &
DenisJ. Hauptly, Taking Another Measure of the "Crisis of Volume" in the U.S. Couts of Appeals,
51 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 97 (1994) (same, and suggesting an alternative analysis).
77
See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 278-97, 339-40.
74
75
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number of problems beyond the comparatively limited ones that they
ascribe to growing dockets.
Finally, although evaluators have performed numerous studies,
the analyses have varied greatly. For instance, a number of assessments have considered intracircuit inconsistency, but a Federal Judicial Center report on appellate structure characterized Professor
Arthur Hellman's work as the "only systematic study of the operation
of precedent in a large circuit."78 Professor Baker also suggested that
evaluators have overemphasized relevant difficulties while devoting in79
sufficient attention to promising solutions.
In fact, Professor Baker and the Federal Courts Study Committee,
an independent, expert entity which recently analyzed the courts and
developed recommendations for their improvement, proposed that a
thorough assessment of the circuits be conducted to clarify imperfect
understanding.8 0 Moreover, Senator Howell Heflin (D-Ala.), who was
a member of the Study Committee and served as chair of the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Courts, stated at the September 1995 hearing on
the Ninth Circuit's division that there "needs to be a careful evaluation of the entire circuit court structure and the administration of
justice."8 1
The particulars of the analysis warrant rather brief treatment
here because similar proposals have been explored elsewhere8 2 as recently as the March 1996 Senate floor debate on the bill that would
split the Ninth Circuit. 83 Congress should mandate a systematic, national assessment of the appellate courts which meticulously identifies
the most troubling complications that rising appeals are causing and
that the appellate courts are facing, the precise sources and effects of
the problems, and the most efficacious combination of solutions.
78

FEDERAL JUDICIAL CErTER,

supra note 73, at 94; see also Arthur D. Hellman, Main-

tainingConsistency in the Law of the Large Circuit, in RESTRUCTURINGJUSTICE 55-90 (Arthur D.

Hellman ed., 1990) (examining the consistency in the Ninth Circuit); Arthur D. Hellman,
Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 Amiz. ST. LJ. 915
(1991) (same); Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism andJurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of
Precedent in the LargeAppellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541 (1989) (same).
79 See Baker Conversation, supra note 64; see also supra note 76 (describing multiple
studies of appellate court difficulties).
80 See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE, supra note 17, at 116-17;
BAKER, supra note 5, at 292-300; see also Federal Courts Study Act, § 101, 102 Stat. at 4644.
81

S. REP. No. 197, supra note 3, at 19-20 (statement of Sen. Heflin).

82 See BAKER, supra note 5, at 292-300; see also Thomas E. Baker, A ProposalThat Congress Createa Commission on FederalCourtStructur, 14 Miss. C. L. REv. 271 (1994) (suggesting
a congressional study of appeals courts and their dockets); Tobias, supranote 3, at 1407-09
(same).
83 The Senate passed a bill that would create a study commission. See 142 CONG. REC.
S2544 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996); see also SenateJudiciary Committee Markup of S. 956 (Dec.
7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (offering similar proposal).
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The relative success of the Federal Courts Study Committee and
of the Hruska Commission,8 4 which performed a similar evaluation
during the early 1970s, shows that they could function as informative
models. Senators and representatives should analyze those endeavors
to avoid the difficulties that they encountered. For example, Congress probably assigned the Study Committee, consisting of individuals with many other important obligations, overly broad duties which
were difficult to complete in a year and a half. These prior experiences indicate that senators and representatives must authorize a fulltime professional staff, enunciate a clear charter, and provide the entity more than eighteen months to conclude its task.
Congress ought to establish a commission resembling the Federal
Courts Study Committee or the Hruska Commission. This commission should include people, such as Senator Heflin or Ninth Circuit
Judge Charles Wiggins, with prior experience serving on either the
Federal Courts Study Committee or the Hruska Commission.8 5 The
commission must be comprised of many senators and representatives,
most of whom serve on the respective Judiciary Committees, numerous federal judges, and some Executive Branch officials. It should
probably encompass state government officials, practicing lawyers,
legal academicians, and the public. The chair might be a senator or
representative or a member of the federal bench, such as a Supreme
Court Justice.
The two Houses of Congress and the federal judiciary should
have substantial representation for several reasons. The service of
many senators and representatives will be crucial because Congress
must ultimately resolve the complex policy questions that are at issue,
and will probably consider the determinations and suggestions of a
commission in which numerous members of the Senate and House
have participated more persuasive. The inclusion of many federal
judges will be equally critical, as the decisions that Congress premises
on the results of the study will substantially affect the federal bench.
The judiciary must implement those policy choices and may more
readily accept determinations based on the findings and suggestions
of an entity which included numerous colleagues. Indeed, meaningful reform probably cannot be achieved until judges agree on a statement of the problem and reach consensus on a solution.

84 See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrrEE, supra note 17; Commission
on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The GeographicBoundaries of the Several
Judicial Circuits: Recommendationsfor Change, reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973) [hereinafter

Hruska Commission].
85

See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 17, at iii; Hruska

Commission, supra note 84, at 224. See generally BAKER,supra note 5, at 296-99.
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Congress should supply funding to support travel, hearings, and a
commission staff of full-time professionals. A number of these employees must possess relevant expertise relating to the collection, evaluation, and synthesis of data which implicate demographic trends and
future demands that the federal civil and criminal justice systems will
experience. Some personnel should have more specific familiarity
with the phenomena which are attributed to circuit caseload growth,
including the differential appellate justice that the authors believe
parties with limited resources or power receive, numerous additional
difficulties confronting the federal courts, and the efficacy of a broad
spectrum of possible remedies.
The entity's appointed members and its staff should be diverse,
especially in terms of their perspectives on federal civil and criminal
justice.8 6 The committee must promote the greatest feasible participation in commission endeavors by interested persons and organizations. The study group should solicit the assistance of many public
and private institutions, such as the Judiciary Committees, the Federal
Judicial Center, the American Bar Association, and the National
Center for State Courts,8 7 which have much applicable expertise and
material regarding the federal courts. The entity will obviously want
to capitalize on the efforts of similar, earlier projects by, for instance,
consulting the wealth of information which the Federal Courts Study
88
Committee and the Hruska Commission compiled.
Congress must ask that the entity identify the problems ascribed
to mounting appellate dockets, other complications facing the federal
courts, and the most effective solutions to these difficulties. The committee can best accomplish those tasks by initially remembering that
all of the complications constitute a polycentric problem, and by assembling, assessing, and synthesizing the relevant empirical data.8 9
At the outset, the group should also attempt to answer certain
normative questions, or at least to articulate clearly and comprehensively the normative assumptions which underlie its work. Most of
86

See BAKER, supranote 5, at 297; see also supra text accompanying note 16 (affording

example of diversity).
87 This list is obviously not exhaustive. For more suggestions, see BAKER, supranote 5,
at 295-96. The entity should rely on states' experiences in reforming their appellate systems. See id. at 298. See generally COFFIN, supra note 10, at 43-65 (describing the relationship
between state and federal courts). It must also consult other countries' experiences. See
Martin Shapiro, Appeal 14 LAw & Soc'v REv. 629 (1980). See generally HENRYJ. ABRAHAM,
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 288-300 (6th ed. 1993) (outlining the role of appellate review in
several European countries).
88 See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE, supra note 17; Hruska Commission, supra note 84.
89 The effort to marshal data will be an important departure point; however, the twoyear study that some observers and I envision will probably not permit the commission to
conduct its own empirical studies. See supra notes 83, 84, 88 and accompanying text.
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these issues defy felicitous resolution and are relatively abstract. For
example, what do "appeal as of right" and 'just, speedy, and inexpensive" appellate disposition mean today?90 Some questions have theoretical and practical dimensions. For example, how important is
litigant satisfaction, and do parties differentiate between Article III
and Article I judicial decisionmakers and, if so, how does this distinction affect the litigants' views of the federal courts? 9 1 A few issues are
primarily practical. For instance, how much should the nation spend,
and what amount will Congress appropriate, to reattain the Learned
Hand tradition? These queries assume that reinstating that tradition
would benefit parties who now receive less attention in the appellate
system and could be harmonized with the prompt, cheap and equita92
ble resolution of appeals.
Typical of those fundamental inquiries that the entity might pursue is the effort to define "modem appellate decisionmaking." For
example, how much time should judges devote to disposition by discussing cases in conferences and by deliberating or writing opinions
alone, and is there an ideal mix? These types of questions implicate
the continuing applicability of the normative values implicit in the
Learned Hand model for all appeals, given the current and future
realities of expanding dockets and contracting resources. 93
When the commission specifically considers possible problems, it
should rely upon the greatest quantity of applicable empirical material, while keeping in mind the above normative issues and the
90
See FED. R. APP. P. 3. "Appeal as of right" could be critical to the study. The commission might define the idea by asking whether the primary responsibilities of appeals
courts today are correcting error, lawmaking, or promoting intracircuit uniformity. See
supra note 15 and accompanying text. For discussion of these and related issues, see
BAKER, supranote 5, at 14-30; Dalton, supra note 14, at 66, 69-86; Starr, supranote 13, at 2-7.
"Just,speedy, and inexpensive" resolution of disputes is the ideal expressed in FED. R. Cv.
P. 1, and should be equally applicable to appellate procedure.
91 Although litigant satisfaction is a significant value, defining modem appeal as of
right is more important to the commission's work. I include litigant satisfaction here primarily for illustrative purposes. See Dalton, supra note 14, at 66-68, 75-86; Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and
LitigationAccess Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-PartI, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172-77.
92 The queries also assume that the tradition's time-honored nature would warrant its
reinstitution; however, historical custom does not necessarily support modem usage. I
mention costs here primarily for illustrative purposes. The commission should consider
the costs of promising alternatives after identifying them. See infra note 100.
93
There are many other value-laden issues, such as whether increasing appeals and
judges' geographic dispersion in most appellate courts mean that future collegiality will
primarily involve judges and law clerks, and whether electronic communications might
ameliorate these conditions. See supra notes 12, 41, 49, 58 and accompanying text. Questions, such as the textual one, may ultimately be left to judicial discretion, which standards

or categorical requirements could guide. Others seem almost rhetorical. For discussion of
these and related issues, see BAKER, supra note 5, at 14-30, 287-302; CoFFIN, supra note 10,
at 15-41, 301-25.
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polycentric nature of the complication which it is confronting. 9 4 The
committee might pinpoint the phenomena that can be ascribed to
multiplying appellate caseloads, their sources, and the difficulties
which they pose. The group also ought to ascertain whether judges
have limited the appellate access afforded to parties with relatively littie economic or political power and, if so, determine why, in what
circumstances, and whether the discrepancies warrant treatment.
Should the entity find disparities, it ought to determine, for instance,
how often the provision of oral argument or the issuance of published
opinions would have been important in social security appeals raising
well-settled questions of law or in pro se cases presenting frivolous
legal arguments. Because individual evaluators and independent, expert study commissions have thoroughly analyzed numerous relevant
problems, the committee should focus its efforts on potential
solutions. 95
Assuming that the group will deem necessary some remediation
of particular complications, such as discrepancies in appellate justice,
it must employ a carefully-calibrated assessment. The entity should
attempt to designate the best approach by invoking the largest
amount of pertinent empirical information, and by remembering the
applicable normative questions and the polycentric character of the
96
problem which it is addressing.
The commission ought to evaluate the efficacy of many, diverse
remedies, quantitatively and qualitatively scrutinizing their benefits
and detriments. Measures that simultaneously facilitate realization of
the Learned Hand tradition and expeditious, inexpensive, and fair
97
resolution of appeals should generally be considered promising.
When the committee analyzes the specific solution of expanding the
bench, it should predict the substantive effects on cases which receive
less attention and the impacts, such as additionally fragmenting fed94
95
96

See supra notes 48, 90-93 and accompanying text.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
Because a polycentric problem involves multiple sources that interact and contrib-

ute to the problem, it is important to identify and allow for the sources, their interactions,

and respective contributions while isolating and accounting for other relevant variables
when identifying efficacious solutions. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
AdministrativeLaw, 88 HARv. L. Rxv. 1667 (1975) (analyzing polycentricity in administrative
law context); Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to PartyJoinder, 65 N.C. L
REv. 745, 769-92 (1987) (same in procedural context).
97 This is rather general and assumes that the above questions implicating the
Learned Hand tradition can be resolved. The commission might identify solutions by capi-

talizing on the efforts of appeals courts to satisfy both goals. See, e.g., 3RD Ci. R. 34.1(c)
(authorizing panels to specify issues counsel must elaborate in oral argument); see also4TH
CIR. R. 34(b) (providing for submission of informal briefs and for appointment of counsel
for indigent pro se litigants when further briefing and oral argument would be of assistance); Tobias, supra note 3, at 1363-64, 1405-06

experimentation).

(affording examples

of circuit
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eral law and further eroding appeals courts' federalizing responsibility, on appellate structure. 9 8
The group must correspondingly attempt to match possible remedies with the difficulties found. For instance, if the entity ascertains
that a significant number of pro se litigants would benefit from the
assistance of counsel, it could explore means of affording legal representation, such as greater pro bono contributions by the practicing
bar or increases in the budget of the Legal Services Corporation. 99
If, as now appears probable, the committee cannot identify one
superior solution for rising appeals and other complications experienced by appellate courts, it should designate that mix of alternatives
which would be most beneficial, especially by predicting how multiple
remedies might work together. Finally, the group must compile those
measures that seem most promising and develop criteria for their evaluation which Congress in turn can consider. 100
After the Senate and the House of Representatives assess the
commission's findings and recommendations, Congress must draft
proposed legislation that embodies the best combination of approaches. 01' Once both Houses hold hearings on these possibilities,
senators and representatives should be able to agree on solutions for
the problems which are attributable to docket growth and additional
difficulties that the appellate courts face.
CONCLUSION

Professors Richman and Reynolds have significantly enhanced
understanding of the recent transformation in the appeals courts and
its important implications. The authors describe how expanding
caseloads led the appellate courts to limit procedural access, particularly for parties with minimal resources or power, and propose that
Congress respond by dramatically enlarging the federal bench.
Because considerable uncertainty remains about all of the phenomena ascribed to increasing dockets and numerous other complications confronting the appeals courts, as well as the best solutions to
these problems, senators and representatives should create a national
commission to study the appellate system. That entity must evaluate
the difficulties attributable to multiplying caseloads and additional
98
99

See supra notes 40, 53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
100 For example, the measures' cost will be an important parameter. See supranote 90
and accompanying text. See generally BAKER, supra note 5, at 296-97 (discussing the proposed Commission on Federal Court Structure).
101 I rely substantially in this paragraph on BARER, supra note 5, at 296-97. See generally
FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BusiNEss OF THE SUPREME COURT, A STUDY IN
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 107-27 (1927) (suggesting that "designers of new judicial

machinery meet the chief needs of their generation").
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complications which the appeals courts face and suggest solutions to
the problems identified. With this information, Congress should be
able to prescribe remedies that the judiciary can implement effectively
and that will address the major difficulties which the appellate courts
02
experience.'

102 Time pressures precluded my thorough response to the response by Professors
Reynolds and Richman to this piece. SeeWilliam L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, StudyingDeck Chairson the Titanic,81 CoRNELL L. REV. 1290 (1996). I do offer one terse suggestion. Even were Congress and the federal judiciary substantially more amenable to
increases in the appellate bench on the order of magnitude that Reynolds and Richman
recommend, do we actually know with sufficient certainty the precise effects of radically
expanding the bench's size? In other words, might the increase suggested be a Titanic
mistake? Would doubling deck chairs on the Titanic have made any difference?

